Beberapa ketika dahulu rakyat 1Malaysia telah dikejutkan dengan beberapa acessories milik Rosmah Mansor antaranya bag tangan 'Birkin' yang mencecah ratusan ribu RM dan juga 'Bangle' atau gelang tangan yang bernilai jutaan RM dan cincin RM24Juta.

Rosmah Mansor dikatakan memiliki sekurang-kurangnya 11 beg tangan mewah jenama Birkin dianggarkan Rosmah membelanjakan minima RM638,000 hingga maksima RM5,192,000 untuk membeli beg tangan berkenaan.

Bagi beg edisi terhad miliknya pula harga sebuah beg tangan dikatakan mencecah RM28,000 (US$ 9,000) hingga RM472,000 (US$150,000) bagi setiap satu.. sila baca di ( SINI )

Cincin berlian yang dikenali sebagai ‘Natural Fancy Blue Gray Cushion Cut” miliknya itu berharga lebihkurang RM24 Juta.. sila baca di ( SINI )

Kali ini kita akan melihat lagi koleksi barangan mewah milik Rosmah Mansor iaitu jam tangan pula..

Terkini koleksi yang jam tangan yang dipakai Rosmah dalam satu majlis yang dihadirinya di Vietnam berjaya dirakam lensa kamera…



Ianya dikatakan dikatakan bernilai antara £70,000 - £100,000. Dan harga tersebut tidak termasuk duti import lagi...

Atau dalam nilai RM lebih kurang RM350,000 hingga RM500,000 sahaja..

Dengan mengambil kira gaji minimum baru bagi Semenanjung Malaysia iaitu sebanyak RM900 manakala di Sabah dan Sarawak diletakkan pada paras RM800.. rakyat Malaysia perlu mengambil masa selama seperti perkiraan di bawah untuk memilikinya..

RM900 x 12 (bulan) = RM10800 x 46 tahun 4 bulan = RM500,400

Ini bermakna mereka memerlukan sekurang-kurangnya 46 tahun lama untuk memiliki jam tangan mewah berjenama Franck Muller ini..

*perkiraan itu berdasarkan gaji minima dimana rakyat Malaysia yang punya gaji minima itu dianggap tidak makan dan minum* he..he..he.. boleh ke?

Harga jam tangan Rosmah Mansor sahaja sudah menyamai 1-2 buah harga rumah yang agak selesa..

Perlu kita ketahui bahawa Jenama Franck Muller merupakan salah satu jenama yang telah menghasilkan antara jam tangan paling mahal di dunia yang bernilai USD2.4 juta.



Persoalannya di sini ialah..

1~ Bagaimana beliau boleh berbelanja mewah seperti ini?

2~Bagaimana Rosmah Mansor masih mampu meneruskan tabiatnya sehingga mampu memililki satu lagi barangan mewah (jam tangan berjenama Franck Muller) selepas berjaya melakukannya ketika memiliki cincin bernilai RM24 juta sebelum ini.

3~Banyak sangatkah pendapatan seorang yang bergelar Perdana Menteri Malaysia sehingga berjaya menampung perbelanjaan mewah isterinya selama ini? Adakah ada lagi “Pendapatan Sampingan”? Mungkin?

Walaubagaimanapun, carian untuk rekabentuk seperti yang dipakai oleh Rosmah Mansor tiada dalam senaraian jenama Franck Muller, besar kemungkinan ia cukup ekslusif dan direka khas untuk Rosmah Mansor mungkin?

Sumber info dari sini ( Politicalgags ) dan ( Berita Semasa )

Info lebih lengkap sila lihat di ( Politicalgags )

sumber

https://www.facebook.com/100005079496519/videos/752096894969620/

Apa itu Wahhabi?

Wahhabi bukan kerana mereka tidak membaca qunut subuh sementelah tiga mazhab lain pun tidak membaca qunut subuh. Itu khilaf mazhab saja; bukan juga apabila tidak membuat kenduri arwah kerana ada qaul dalam mazhab Syafie yang tidak menggalakkannya; bukan juga kerana itu dan ini tetapi sebenarnya, Wahhabi adalah satu cara berfikir yang salah membentuk satu gerakan ekstrem yang boleh memecah-belahkan masyarakat.

The Shocking Truth About 1MDB - We Unlock The Officially Secret AG Report

• 6 July 2016

Sarawak Report has now gained extensive access to the Auditor General’s report into 1MDB, along with key accompanying documents from the enquiry.
This report was originally commissioned to shed light on the disappearance of billions of dollars, but was later declared an ‘Official Secret’ by Najib Razak.
Our review has made it abundantly clear why Najib decided that the findings could not be released, since he wishes to remain Prime Minister – after all he is also the Finance Minister and sole shareholder responsible for decision-making at 1MDB and the conclusions are damning.
What the Auditor General encountered, according to the documents, was chaos and confusion in an organisation where senior executives were unable to provide convincing or consistent explanations for vast payments made to a bogus subsidiary of Abu Dhabi’s sovereign fund Aabar and to a separate false subsidiary of an earlier venture partner, PetroSaudi.
A grand total of US$7 billion is calculated as having gone missing and conflicting and unbelievable explanations were given about why the payments were made.
The AG lamented that the justifications provided for retrospective Board ratifications of those payments (which had already been made months earlier by management without prior permission) changed from one year to the next: furthermore, multi-billion dollar payments were made for the same advertised purpose two times over.
The AG even complained that management would provide one story to his enquiry on one occasion and then completely re-write their own version of events the next time they met.
There was never sufficient proof according to his data, to back up the stories being told. In particular, bank statements were not provided to substantiate many of the simply enormous sums that 1MDB management alleged were being invested in various funds or in ‘refundable deposits’ or ‘terminations of options’ with the bogus Aabar Investments PJS Limited, based in the British Virgin Islands.


On one case the AG was plainly so incensed by the variable and inconsitent claims by 1MDB management (headed by CEO Arul Kanda), that he described their final version of events as “suspicious” and “unsubstantiated” and therefore refused to accept the documents 1MDB had provided as reliable evidence.
This matter related to a purported US$1.392 billion, that had supposedly been redeemed from 1MDB’s Cayman Island fund, and was originally recorded as having been spent on the termination of options owed to Aabar ($993 million), plus the repayment of loans.
That is what the Board was informed in December 2014 and what was recorded in the Annual Report (even though the AG records there was insufficient proof this was how the money was spent).


Then as late as February 2016, to the AG’s disbelief, he was presented with a series of papers ratified by the Board on November 26th 2015 which a year on provided an entirely separate story for how the money was used.
Based on an alleged agreement signed by management in October 6th 2014 (after most of the money had already been paid), the Board on November 26th 2015 retrospectively ratified a series of payments to Aabar Ltd totalling US$1.15 billion saying they had been for the ‘extension of guarantees’ for loans (see our previous story).
The AG complained that there had been no mention of this belated new explanation when he had previously met with 1MDB in December, although it had all been supposedly signed off the previous month:

a.     Although this resolution was approved on Nov 26, 2015 it was only presented to the JAN [AG enquiry] on Feb 2016. This important information was not raised during (JAN’s) discussions with 1MDB’s management held on Dec 16, 2015. This raises doubts on the veracity of the information and documents which were presented.
b.     This also showed that the 1MDB management had made payments without prior knowledge or approval from the Board. The information is also in conflict with information that was given by the 1MDB management during the Board meeting on Dec 20, 2014 – that USD1.392 billion from the redeeming of SPC funds had been used to pay for Aabar’s Termination of Options amounting to USD993 million and the USD399 million used for interest payments for the USD Note(s). However, JAN was unable to verify both payments. [Addendum Document to AG’s Report]

It gets worse, thundered the AG in his addendum to his report, explaining why he had rejected the belated material from his enquiry, on the grounds that it was simply too suspicous:

Although the agreement was signed on Oct 6, 2014, the document was only presented to JAN on Feb 2016 and this important information was not acknowledged or raised during meetings with 1MDB’s management on Dec 16, 2015. This raises doubts on the veracity of the information and documents that were presented.
4. Remittance Slip regarding payments to Aabar and Aabar Ltd
There are 9 remittance slips regarding payments to Aabar (1) and to Aabar Limited (8) which were presented to JAN on Feb 2016. This important information was not acknowledged or raised during meetings with 1MDB’s management on Dec 16, 2015. The veracity of the format of documents was suspicious as it does not include written instructions to the bank nor bank statements as supporting documents.[Addendum Document to AG’s Report]

Double payment meant 1MDB bought out Aabar’s ‘options’ for  more than its guaranteed power plants were even worth!

The AG continues by saying that according to the original data provided by 1MDB the ‘options to Aabar’ were terminated twice over with near identical payments totalling over US$1.8 billion – more than the total value of the 49% of the company Aabar was supposed to be guaranteeing.
Indeed it seems clear that the decision to alter the reason given for these payments was only taken after this outrageous double payment had been spotted and reported upon in the press over a year later. The AG wasn’t buying it:

5. Funds from the Duetsche Bank loan (USD250 mil and USD975 mil), a total of USD855 mil was used for Aabar’s termination of option from May to Sept 2014. According to the Board’s minutes on Dec 20, 2014, a total of USD993 mil was also paid between Sept and Dec 2014. This means that the total amount paid for the termination of option was USD1.848 billion. The total termination of options payment amounting to USD855 million was only changed to Top Up Collateral (Security Deposit) a year later through the Ratification of IPO Variation Payment Made to IPIC on Nov 26, 2015. This demonstrated that the original intention of 1MDB was to pay a total of USD1.848 billion to Aabar Ltd, in contrast with the total stated in the Agreement Relating to Option Agreement (Settlement Agreement) amounting to USD300 mil (refer to Chapter 5, para 7.3.3.4. Pg 189). [Addendum Document to AG’s Report]
Apart from this, the USD1.848 billion amount exceeded the 49% equity value  in 1MDB Energy Sdn Bhd (1MESB), which amounts to RM1.225 billion, and RM862.40 million in 1MDB Energy Langat Sdn Bhd (1MELSB) which amounts to RM2.09 billion in total (refer to Chap 5, para 7.3.2. Pg 182).

Slack?

That a government fund could be run in such a negligent fashion, with such an apparent slip-shod attitude towards the dispensing of billions of dollars of public money, would under normal circumstances defy belief.

Scanning through the AG’s forensic analysis, readers are consequently led to one glaring conclusion, which is that no one, from 1MDB’s management to the Board, considered it to be their job to worry about the genuine custody and investment of all this cash. In other words, the fund was plainly a front behind which money was being siphoned out by the man in charge (the sole shareholder/Finance Minister/Prime Minister).
No one could conclude otherwise from the narrative and criticism laid out in the AG’s 300 page plus report and analysis, as we shall show over coming articles.
No wonder the Prime Minister, who had a year before assured Malaysians that their concerns would be put to rest about the loss-making fund through this audit, has decided to make it a secret instead.

Changing Options

This was how the Auditor General in the main body of his report referred to how the Board was informed about the supposed second payment of options to Aabar, made from money lent by Deutsche Bank, based on a promise that there was a collateral cash holding of a billion dollars in BSI Bank Singapore (untrue).

“8.9 The Board of Directors [of 1MDB] were informed on Dec 20, 2014 that Deutsche Bank AG, Singapore had agreed that the USD993 million be used to pay for Aabar’s termination of options from redeeming the SPC funds amounting to USD1.392 billion. Tthe balance of USD399 million were to be used to pay interest off loans in USD Notes.

8.10 However, details about the payment of USD993 million to Aabar for the termination of options and the interest payments on the USD Notes amounting to USD399 could not be verified by JAN. The Board of Directors had also sought details on the payments on Dec 20, 2014, but checks by JAN have established that the matter was not raised again during subsequent Board of Directors meetings. During their meeting on Feb 23, 2015, the Board of Directors had raised the issue of payments for Aabar’s termination of options, and that they were informed only after the payment was made. This showed that the payment for Aabar’s termination of options was made without the Board of Director’s approval.”

Bogus Guarantees

The AG also deals with the whole frustrating story of  the supposed ‘security deposits for guarantees’, which we now also know were in fact never part of the formal agreements with Aabar/IPIC when the Abu Dhabi fund agreed to guarantee the US$3.5 billion raised in two ‘power purchase’ loans in May and October 2012.
He confirms that nevertheless a total of US$1.367 billion was paid in the name of such guarantees to the bogus Aabar Limited in BVI:

Chap 5 – Energy Sector.
Item 7 “Funding for 1MDB Group’s Energy Sector”
7.3.2.2. Collaboration Agreement for Credit Enhancement
7.3.2.2. (f) Checks by JAN [AG Department] found that the security deposit amounting to USD1.367 billion (RM4.468 billion) was paid by 1MEL (1MDB Energy Ltd) and 1MELL (1MDB Energy [Langat] Ltd) to Aabar Ltd and was recorded as a security deposit in the financial statements of 1MEHL (1MDB Energy Holdings Ltd) for the year ending May 31 2013 and 2014. However, the security deposit payments were made without the approval of the Board of Directors. The responsibility of payment for the security deposit for the issuance of the first USD Notes was transferred to 1MEHL because 1MEHL had acquired 1MEL from 1MDB. This is based on the Assumption for Obligations Agreement dated Nov 1, 2012 between 1MEHL and 1MEL. Details are as follows:
Table 5.27 – Security Deposit Payments to Aabar Ltd [pg 184]

Date	Payee	Total USD mil	Total RM mil
22/05/2012	1MEL	576.94	1,885.73
19/10/2012	1MELL	790.35	2,583.63
TOTAL		1,367.29	4,468.99

Source: Agreement and Deloitte papers
Note: BNM exchange rates = May 2012 (RM3.18) and Oct 2012 (RM3.06)

Total of US$7 billion missing!

The above dodgy payment, it should be noted, joins a number of others which the AG said 1MDB failed to substantiate with any concrete evidence such as bank statements.
Accompanying the report is a chart produced by the AG’s department detailing the unsatisfactory and unproven payments identified by his enquiry, with total up to the US$7 billion, which the AG concludes has effectively gone missing from 1MDB:

INVESTMENTS WHICH COULD NOT BE VERIFIED

[GRAND TOTAL $6.87 bn]

The culpability and deliberate deceit behind all this mismanagement is summed up by the Auditor in his addendum document about the bogus ‘Top-Up Security Deposit’.  His final paragraph states that the then CEO and present Board Member Shahrol Halmi, knew perfectly well there were no payments owing to Aabar for its guarantees on the loan. This was because the AG had a copy of the original agreement signed between Halmi and IPIC/Aabar in May 2012. IPIC was happy to rely on the promise of a Malaysian Ministry of Finance obligation to 1MDB (ie the taxpayer was liable).

IPIC and 1MDB had signed another agreement known as Interguarantor Agreement on May 21, 2012. This agreement was signed by Shahrol Azral on behalf of 1MDB and Khadem Al-Qubaisy for IPIC. Checks by JAN showed that the agreement did not state a need for 1MDB or its subsidiaries to issue USD Notes to implement the “option and credit enhancement” to Aabar Ltd in return for a guarantee from IPIC. (emphasis theirs).
According to the main condition of this agreement, 1MDB must continue to be wholly owned by MKD (Finance Ministry Inc). 1MDB also needs to receive sufficient support and funds from MKD to repay IPIC, should 1MDB fail to repay all the cost, expenditure and all obligations regarding this note [USD Notes?]. Although a guarantee was given by IPIC, 1MDB still bears all the risks should there be any failure to pay for all the cost regarding the servicing of the USD Note.

Following the AG’s report and parallel Public Accounts Committee report the Inspector General of Police publicly notified that he would be investigating this former CEO and Board Member of 1MDB over suspected criminal behaviour.


However, a month later and no such moves have been made, although numerous critics of 1MDB (all vindicated) have been harassed, persecuted and charged on apparently trumped up charges.
Halmi, on the other hand, has let it be known that he considers himself protected by the power of the Prime Minister/Finance Minister and the kind and gracious support which he is receiving from his wife, Rosmah Mansor.

BOMBSHELL – NAJIB & CO 

STRIPPED 

NAKED BY BANKERS, NOT 

MAHATHIR’S MEN: NOWHERE 

LEFT TO HIDE – 

DAY OF RECKONING NEARS 

FOR 1MDB CULPRITS

Pouring money and resources into BN’s election campaign – stolen from 1MDB… but what exactly for? – SARAWAK REPORT
-http://realpolitikasia.blogspot.my.

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) may have finally shed light on what happened to the US$620 million that “Malaysian Official 1” (MO1) had returned to his "donor".
In a latest civil forfeiture suit filing, the DOJ alleged that at least US$27.3 million was used to buy a 22-carat pink diamond pendant and necklace for “MO1's wife.”
It also indicated that the returned "donation" money was used by Penang born-tycoon Jho Low to purchase a US$750,000 photograph as a gift for actor Leonardo DiCaprio.
MO1 is described by the DOJ as a high-ranking government official.
In response to last year's civil forfeiture suits, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Abdul Rahman Dahlan had confirmed that MO1 was Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak.
Najib has denied allegations of misappropriating public funds for personal gain while Abdul Rahman (photo) said the fact Najib was not named in the DOJ filing showed that the prime minister was not a subject of investigation.
In last year's suits, the DOJ claimed that a total of US$731 million of allegedly misappropriated 1MDB funds had entered the personal accounts of MO1.
This included US$681 million transferred in March 2013, which the DOJ documents quoted the Malaysian attorney-general Mohammed Apandi Ali as saying that it was a personal donation from a member of the Saudi royal family.
The DOJ and Apandi both noted that in August 2013, US$620 million of the funds was returned.
However, the DOJ claimed the money had originated from 1MDB, and was transferred to MO1 from, and later returned to, the Singapore bank account of Tanore Corporation.

'Account was controlled by Low'
Singapore court cases on 1MDB established that the account was controlled by Low.
However, what happened to the returned US$620 million had remained a mystery until the allegations were listed in the DOJ's 251-page lawsuit yesterday.
On June 2013, two months before the sum was returned, the DOJ said Low had contacted jeweller Lorraine Schwartz, asking urgently for a diamond necklace with a "18 carrot (sic) pink heart diamond".
The next month, Schwartz travelled to Monaco with a 22-carat pink diamond, to meet Low, as well as then Aabar chief executive officer Mohamed Ahmed Badawy Al-Husseiny, aboard a yacht.
Also on board the yacht was the wife of MO1, and her friend - dubbed by the DOJ as "Malaysian Friend".
On the yacht, the group purportedly discussed the design of the necklace that would hold the pink diamond.
According to the DOJ, Schwartz's next encounter with MO1's wife was in New York on Sept 28, to show a layout of the necklace's design.
Najib and his wife Rosmah Mansor were in New York at the time for the UN general assembly. Najib addressed the assembly on Sept 28.
The DOJ claimed that the finished necklace was later delivered to "Malaysian Friend" in Hong Kong on March 7, 2014, so that it could be delivered to MO1's wife.
It is not clear if or when MO1's wife personally received the necklace.
The DOJ alleged that payment for the US$27.3 million piece of jewellery had originated from the US$620 million MO1 returned to Tanore in August 2013.
On Sept 9, 2013, US$58.85 million from the Tanore account was channelled to another account - Midhurst Trading Limited - which Singapore courts established was opened by Low under the alias of Eric Tan.
The next day, US$32.76 million was transferred from Midhurst to a DBS Singapore bank account for Blackrock, another account held nominally by Tan.
From there, two wire transfers were made to Schwartz's Bank of America accounts totalling US$27.3 million.
The DOJ noted that Low might have used Tan's email to ensure his name was not associated with the diamond's purchase records.
An email, from Tan to Schwartz's assistant, had asked for Low's name not to be stated in further emails "as he is just an introducer and not the buyer".
Besides the US$27.3 million pink diamond necklace, the DOJ also accused Low of purchasing 27 different 18-carat gold necklaces and bracelets for MO1's wife, worth a total of US$1.3 million.
The gold necklaces and bracelets were bought using funds allegedly misappropriated from a Deutsche Bank loan meant for a legitimate subsidiary of Abu Dhabi's International Petroleum Investment Co (IPIC) - but was diverted to a dubious company mimicking IPIC subsidiaries.
Meanwhile, another purchase allegedly made using the US$620 million MO1 had returned, was a photograph by Diane Arbus titled “Boy with the Toy Hand Grenade".
The U$750,000 photograph was purchased with funds allegedly channelled from the Tanore account to former 1MDB subsidiary SRC International.
The DOJ claimed that on Aug 30, 2013, three days after the US$620 million was returned, a total of US$334 million was sent from Tanore to two overseas investment firms Enterprise Emerging Market Funds (Enterprise) and Cistenique Investment Fund (Cistenique).
Then, between Sept 4 and Sept 6, 2013, a total of US$232.9 million was allegedly wired from Enterprise and Cistenique to SRC International.
The DOJ claimed that US$233.4 million was then wired from SRC International to another investment firm - Pacific Harbor Global Growth Fund.
On Sept 10, the DOJ said, US$228.7 million was transferred from Pacific Harbor to a shell company nominally controlled by Tan, dubbed Affinity Equity.
Then between Oct 28 and Oct 30, 2013, Affinity Equity transferred US$1 million to another account nominally controlled by Tan dubbed the Platinum Global account.
It was from this account that the US$750,000 for the photograph was paid for, on Nov 1, 2013.
The DOJ stated that in March 2014, Low gave the photograph to DiCaprio as a gift.
However, what happened to the rest of the US$620 million that MO1 returned is unclear.
The US$681 milllion MO1 had received has become popularly known in Malaysia as the RM2.6 billion donation.
Najib and his supporters have insisted that it was a donation from a Saudi royalty.

The US Department of Justice (DOJ), in its third and newest asset seizure filing announced last night, revealed a previously undisclosed phase in which more of 1MDB funds were allegedly siphoned.
The 251-page filing described this fourth part as the "Options Buyback" phase in which US$850 million was siphoned from two loans totalling US$1.225 billion.
1MDB, through its subsidiary 1MDB Energy Holdings Limited, had taken the US$250 million and US$975 million loans from Deutsche Bank.
This money, like in previous phases, was partially used for the benefit of certain individuals including executives of 1MDB and Aabar Investments PJS as well Malaysian officials and their relatives.
However, a key difference, was that a significant sum was also used to "cover the hole" in 1MDB's subsidiary Brazen Sky Limited, which claimed to have US$2.318 billion worth of "fund units" in Bridge Global Absolute Return Fund (Bridge Global Fund), managed by Bridge Partners Investment Management Limited, but the DOJ said is "relatively worthless".
This was achieved by recycling the Deutsche Bank loan through a network of transactions that made it appear as if Brazen Sky was progressively redeeming the fund units for cash when they were, in fact, the same money going in circles.
Before delving into the elaborate and complex scheme in the cover-up of the fund units, it should be noted that the first DOJ filing had outlined three other phases in which 1MDB's funds were allegedly siphoned.
One of this was the Good Star phase where 1MDB had invested US$1.83 billion in a bogus joint-venture with PetroSaudi International and US$1.03 billion of this money was allegedly siphoned to Penang billionaire Jho Low's Good Star Limited.
1MDB later declared it had sold the investment and received US$2.318 billion in shares, which included a handsome US$488 million profit on its original investment.
It then invested the sum in "fund units" managed by Bridge Partners Investment Management Limited.
In reality, the "fund units" cannot be worth US$2.318 billion as at least US$1.03 billion had been siphoned and the additional US$488 million profit also did not exist, leaving the fund units being worth no more than US$800 million, if not less or any at all.
So then how did 1MDB chief executive officer Arul Kanda Kandasamy, in a statement on Oct 12, 2015, announce that 1MDB had redeemed US$1.39 million of the US$2.3 billion "fund units" held by Brazen Sky Limited?

How conspirators recycled 1MDB funds
According to The DOJ, it started on Sept 5, 2014, when 1MDB drew down US$223 million out of the US$975 million loan from Deustche Bank.
1MDB misrepresented to Deutsche Bank that the loan was intended to buy back share options from Aabar Investments PJS, a subsidiary of Abu Dhabi's International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC).
The money was then disbursed to Aabar Investments PJS Limited (Seychelles) (Aabar-Seychelles), a company owned by rogue Aabar official and Jho Low's associate Mohamed Ahmed Badawy Al-Husseiny, but was made to appear like the subsidiary of IPIC.
Aabar-Seychelles then transferred US$111 million to Lambasa Global Opportunity Fund which then passed US$110 million to Bridge Global Fund.
On Sept 11, 2014, Bridge Global Fund then transferred the US$110 million to Brazen Sky, which was framed as a "redemption" but ultimately originated from 1MDB's Deustche Bank loan.
A day later, Brazen Sky transferred US$94 million of the money to 1MDB Global Investments Limited, another subsidiary of 1MDB.
"The purpose of this unnecessarily complicated funds flow was to create the appearance that fund units in the Brazen Sky Account were being redeemed for cash and being paid forward to 1MDB, thereby fraudulently disguising the fact that the fund units were illiquid and relatively worthless," the DOJ said in its filing.
On Sept 29, 2014, after Aabar-Seychelles received a second tranche totalling US$458 million from the US$975 million Deustche Bank loan, it repeated the same pattern by sending US$378 million to Lambasa which then passed US$375 million to Bridge Global which in turned allowed Brazen Sky to "redeem" the money.
On Oct 7, 2014, Brazen Sky then sent US$375 million to 1MDB Global. However, this time, 1MDB Global sent US$356 million back to Aabar-Seychelles.



This process was repeated for another five times.
"By the end of November 2014, proceeds from the first tranche of the $975 million loan had passed through the Brazen Sky account once, and proceeds of the second tranche of the loan had passed through the Brazen Sky Account six times," said the DOJ.
When this repetitive process was finally completed, it appeared as if Brazen Sky had redeemed US$1.412 billion from its "fund units".


However, 1MDB faced a headache as the fraudulently valued Brazen Sky fund units were used as collateral for the Deutsche Bank Loan, which condition included that Brazen Sky cannot transfer its money out.
However, in order to recycle the money, the conspirators had no choice but to breach the loan condition.

'1MDB duped Deutsche Bank'
The DOJ found that 1MDB's executive director of finance, described as "1MDB Officer 4", had faked documents to Deutsche Bank to convince them that no money had left Brazen Sky's account.
1MDB ultimately defaulted on the US$975 million loan, which was followed by Deutsche Bank's demanding an early repayment upon discovery of the deception in May 2015.
IPIC later came in with a US$1 billion emergency loan to help 1MDB make the loan repayment but the white knight deal had since soured and turned into an arbitration case.
Putrajaya had since sought for a settlement with IPIC and had, among others, agreed to repay the US$1 billion loan, with interest, in two tranches.
Ironically, Putrajaya had indicated that 1MDB plans to repay part of the sum using the remaining of Brazen Sky's "fund units", which it claimed is worth US$940 million but its true value remains suspect.
Apart from the Brazen Sky recycling, part of the US$975 million Deutsche Bank loan also benefitted Jho Low, Eric Tan Kim Long (Jho Low's alias) and another rogue Aabar executive Khadem Abdulla Al Qubaisi, totalling around US$29 million.
The US$975 million Deutsche Bank loan had received a letter of support from Malaysian Official 1.
"Internal Deutsche Bank records reflect that 1MDB officials opted to provide a Letter of Support signed by Malaysian Offical 1, rather than some form of guarantee by 1MDB, at least in part because a letter of support did not require Bank Negara or Cabinet approval.
"At the request of 1MDB, all references to the Letter of Support were removed from the Facility Agreement," said the DOJ.
Apart from the US$975 million loan, 1MDB also took out an earlier US$250 million loan from Deutsche Bank.
The disbursement of that loan began on May 28, 2014 and by June 3, 2014, at least US$142 million ended up in Jho Low's personal bank accounts.
Jho Low used the money to purchase a 300-foot luxury yacht.
At least US$1,277,250 of this loan also found its way into the personal bank account of Malaysian Official 1 on June 18, 2014.

Sebenarnya kita selalu kena tipu dengan kedai tayar. Mereka selalu keluarkan tayar yang lama untuk clearkn stok dan dijual pada harga baru. So, kalau yang nak tukar tayar tu, berhati2lah supaya kita tidak tertipu.
Berikut ialah senarai kod yang patut kita tahu tentang tayar. Semoga dapat manfaat bersama.
Sahabat semua, kita selalu tukar tayar kereta, tapi kita tidak tahu bahawa tayar itu tayar yang sudah lama dan tidak sepatutnya digunakan lagi (expired).

Info Pasal tayar kenderaan;
1. Kod Tayar Kenderaan:
Contoh 205/65/R1594H
205 = Lebar
65 = Tinggi
R = Radial
15 = Saiz / Rim
94 = Had Maksimum
Bebanan
H = Had Maksimum
Kelajuan 210km/jam
Lihat Abjad yang last;
S = Maksimum Had Laju
180 km/jam
T = Maksimum Had Laju
190 km/jam
U = Maksimum Had Laju
200 km/jam
V = Maksimum Had Laju
240 km/jam
Z = Maksimum Had Laju
240 km/jam
W = Maksimum Had Laju
270 km/jam
Y = Maksimum Had Laju
300 km/jam
SEBAB TU BANYAK BERLAKU KEMALANGAN YG BERPUNCA DARIPADA KES TAYAR PECAH KERANA PEMILIK KENDERAAN TIDAK ARIF TENTANG KEMAMPUAN LARIAN TAYARNYA DALAM KEADAAN CUACA DI MALAYSIA.

2. Setiap Tayar Ada 4 Angka
Tercatat Di Sisi Tayar.
Contoh 0514
Indeks ini menunjukkan tayar baru keluaran kilang pada minggu ke-5 tahun 2014.

Tempoh penggunaan tayar adalah selama LIMA tahun dari tarikh tayar tersebt dikeluarkan.
Tayar baharu yang berusia lebih daripada lima tahun masih boleh digunakan, tetapi tayar telah menjadi keras sebab getah tayar sudah tamat tempoh penggunaannya (expired).

Jika anda menukar tayar yang baharu, pastikan tahun pengeluarannya ialah tahun yang terkini.
Jika membeli tayar keluaran tahun 2015, minta diskaun sebanyak 20% daripada harga asal.

Berikut ialah diskaun harga tayar berdasarkan tahun tayar yang dikeluarkan dari tahun semasa (2016);
2015 = 20%
2014 = 40%
2013 = 60%
2012 = 80%
2011 ke bawah = PERCUMA

Oleh: Uswatun Hasanah